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Abstract
Mortality due to opioid overdoses has been growing rapidly in the U.S., with some
states experiencing much steeper increases than others. Legalizing medical cannabis
could reduce opioid-related mortality if potential opioid users substitute towards canna-
bis as a safer alternative. I show, however, that a substantial reduction in opioid-
related mortality associated with the implementation of medical cannabis laws can
be explained by selection bias. States that legalized medical cannabis exhibit lower
pre-existing mortality trends. Accordingly, the mitigating eect of medical cannabis
laws on opioid-related mortality vanishes when I include state-specic time trends in
state-year-level dierence-in-dierences regressions.
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1 Introduction
The number of opioid overdose deaths in the United States increased from about 9,000 in
2000 to over 42,000 in 2016. Both the level of and the rise in mortality vary substantially
across states. In 2015, the opioid overdose mortality rate was highest in West Virginia
with 36 per 100,000 population whereas Nebraska had the lowest mortality rate with 3 per
100,000. Mortality growth is even more heterogeneous. Since 1999, mortality rates have
risen between 14% in California and 1,800% in West Virginia and almost 3,000% in North
Dakota. The continued increase of opioid-related mortality also shows that existing policy
responses have not been successful in containing this so-called opioid epidemic.
A potential reduction in opioid overdose mortality may come from the legalization of
medical cannabis.1 Many opioid users initially obtain the drug as a prescription to treat
pain, for which medical cannabis can be a safer and less addictive substitute. For individuals
who are likely to use opioids, including heroin and synthetic opioids, recreationally, access
to cannabis may also provide an alternative, especially when it is legally available before
an individual initiates opioid consumption. While cannabis consumption is prohibited by
federal law, 29 states and the District of Columbia have passed medical cannabis laws (MCL)
to date. Many of these laws regulate access to medical cannabis through dispensaries, where
certied individuals can purchase the drug. Bachhuber et al. (2014) and Powell, Pacula, and
Jacobson (2018) nd that medical cannabis legalization is associated with a 20% to 25%
reduction in mortality rates. Moreover, Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) show that this
reduction mostly operates through active and legal medical cannabis dispensaries.
In this paper, I estimate the eect of medical cannabis legalization on opioid-related
mortality using a dierence-in-dierences (DD) framework that accounts for heterogeneity
in mortality trends across states. Estimates from a \canonical" DD model with state and year
xed eects imply that MCL and active and legal dispensaries signicantly reduce mortality
rates due to opioid overdoses. I nd, however, that this negative eect of medical cannabis
legalization on opioid-related mortality becomes much smaller in absolute value|or even
turns positive|and is mostly statistically insignicant when I include linear or quadratic
state-specic time trends in the DD regressions.
These two sets of estimates indicate that the states that have legalized medical cannabis
exhibit lower pre-existing opioid mortality trends. The standard textbook DD regression
that only includes state and year xed eects cannot account for such dierential trends and
therefore leads to biased estimates. Put dierently, the common trends assumption that is
1Throughout this paper, I refer to the psychoactive drug derived from the cannabis plant as cannabis
instead of marijuana due to the racial implications of the latter term.
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necessary for a DD regression to identify the causal eect of a policy appears to be violated
in this setting. It is possible that states with slower growth in opioid-related mortality are
more likely to implement an MCL because attitudes towards cannabis legalization may be
correlated with economic conditions, health issues, and supply side factors that have given
rise to the opioid epidemic (see Hollingsworth, Ruhm, and Simon, 2017; Ruhm, 2018). For
example, states that have legalized medical cannabis, such as California and Washington,
have lower opioid-related mortality rates than West Virginia and some midwestern states,
which are hit hardest by the opioid epidemic and mostly have no MCL. In a DD regression,
state xed eects can only account for such dierences in levels.
In addition, MCL-states also experienced slower growth in opioid-related mortality be-
fore they implemented these laws than non-MCL-states during the same time period. For
example, in states that introduced an MCL in 2013 (Connecticut and Massachusetts), opi-
oid mortality rates increased by 58% between 1999 and 2012 whereas they rose by 491% in
states that have not implemented an MCL so far (see Table 2). Importantly, a combination
of state and year xed eects cannot account for this pattern in a DD framework. Instead,
it is necessary to include state-specic time trends to obtain unbiased estimates of the eect
of medical cannabis legalization on opioid-related mortality.
After showing that the common trends assumption is likely violated in this case, I compare
the estimated eects of MCL and medical cannabis dispensaries on opioid-related mortality
based on DD regressions without and with linear and quadratic state-specic time trends.
Whereas not including time trends yields negative and statistically signicant coecients,
these eects become mostly indistinguishable from zero with state-specic time trends. While
standard errors increase slightly when I include time trends, the point estimates are also
closer to zero than in regressions without trends. The results exhibit heterogeneity across
types of opioids and over time.
Moreover, I nd that the mitigating impact of MCL on opioid overdose mortality dimin-
ishes over time. Specically, if I include post-2013 years in the sample period, the eect
of MCL becomes statistically insignicant regardless of the inclusion of state-specic time
trends. The sample periods used by Bachhuber et al. (2014) and Powell, Pacula, and Ja-
cobson (2018) end in 2010 and 2013. This nding shows that policies that may have been
eective in the early years of the opioid epidemic are no longer successful in reducing the
number of overdose deaths. Mortality rates have not only grown faster in recent years than
in the 2000s, but the type of opioids most commonly associated with overdose deaths has
shifted from prescription opioids to heroin and more recently to synthetic opioids such as
3
fentanyl. In this evolving public health crisis, it is therefore crucial to re-evaluate policy
responses.
Including state-specic time trends fundamentally alters the implications of this policy
evaluation. Specically, MCL do not seem to provide a successful avenue to lower opioid
overdose mortality.2 More generally, this nding highlights the importance of assessing the
common trends assumption and|if it is violated|modeling group-specic trends in policy
evaluations that rely on DD regressions.
In addition to MCL, I also consider the eect of other policies, including Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP), Naloxone Access Laws, Good Samaritan Laws, and Pill
Mill Bills, on opioid-related mortality. For most of these policies, I do not nd signicant
eects when accounting for state trends.
After showing that time trends matter in analyzing the eect of MCL on opioid-related
mortality, I provide a more general discussion of the role of group-specic time trends in
DD regressions. Specically, I show how policy eects can be biased in the presence of
group-specic time trends when they are not included in a DD regression. To assess the
need for state trends, I then plot residuals from opioid mortality regressions by medical
cannabis's legal status. This simple visual tool allows me to provide further evidence against
the common trends assumption in this context.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section, I provide insti-
tutional background on the opioid crisis, medical cannabis legalization, and other related
policies and discuss the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the mortality data, policy
variables, and the empirical framework. Section 4 assesses the common trends assumption
and contains the regression results. I discuss the importance of group-specic time trends in
DD regressions and the use of residual plots in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Related Literature
In this section, I provide institutional background on the opioid epidemic, MCL, and other
policies designed to reduce opioid-related mortality. I also discuss the existing literature on
these laws and policies.
2Medical cannabis legalization has other benets, however. Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013) show
that MCL lower trac fatalities, for instance, and several studies nd a decline in opioid prescriptions due
to MCL (see Section 2.2 for details).
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2.1 Opioid Overdose Mortality
Addiction to opioids and the resulting rising trend in overdose mortality have become a major
public health crisis in the United States. This so-called opioid epidemic, which claimed over
42,000 lives in 2016, has proceeded in three waves.3 Initially, the increase in opioid deaths
was linked to the abuse of prescription opioid analgesics such as OxyContin (oxycodone),
often obtained from so-called pill mills, i.e. clinics that prescribe large quantities of opioids
without medical need, or on the black market. As prescription opioids became more dicult
to obtain, partially as a result of the implementation of PDMP (see below), many users
switched to heroin, especially in the form of black tar heroin smuggled from Mexico. (See
Quinones (2015) for an account of the diusion of both prescription opioids and black tar
heroin.) As a result, heroin overdose mortality started to rise steeply in 2010. More recently,
synthetic opioids such as fentanyl have become the most common drug involved in overdose
deaths. While fentanyl also plays a medical role as a powerful analgesic, it is increasingly
manufactured and distributed illicitly, which has led to a sharp increase in overdose deaths
starting in 2013. Since the nature and source of the involved drugs dier across these three
waves, there is likely no single policy response that can contain this epidemic. This implies
that policies that have reduced opioid-related mortality in the 2000s and early 2010s may
not be eective any more in this still-evolving crisis. When evaluating existing policies, it
is therefore important to consider the sample period, on which empirical results are based.
I come back to this point when discussing my results below. Specically, I estimate opioid
mortality regressions for samples starting in 1999 and ending in 2010, 2013, and 2015.
2.2 Medical Cannabis Laws
While still classied as a Schedule I drug, i.e. a drug that has a high potential for abuse and
no accepted role for medical treatment, on the federal level, 29 states and the District of
Columbia have legalized the medical use of cannabis to date. The rst state to do so was
California in 1996, and this state was also the rst to regulate activities of medical cannabis
dispensaries. Thirteen states had legalized medical cannabis by 2009, but access to the drug
was dicult in practice due to a lack of distributors who feared prosecution under federal
law. This changed with the 2009 Ogden Memorandum establishing that no federal funds
were to be used to prosecute individuals who complied with state laws. Since then, most
states with MCL have permitted the operation of medical cannabis dispensaries. (See Smith
(2017) for a more detailed account of medical cannabis legalization and especially the role of
3See https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html.
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dispensaries.) Legalizing medical cannabis may aect the consumption of other drugs. For
example, Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013) estimate the eect of MCL on trac fatalities,
implying that there is a substitution from alcohol to cannabis consumption when the latter
becomes legal. This eect does not change in magnitude when including state trends but it
loses its statistical signicance.
In the context of the opioid epidemic, Bradford and Bradford (2016), Bradford and Brad-
ford (2017), Bradford et al. (2018), and Wen and Hockenberry (2018) show that legalization
of medical cannabis reduces the number of prescriptions lled for opioid analgesics among
Medicare and Medicaid enrollees. It is plausible that individuals who use opioids to treat
pain may switch to medical cannabis when the latter becomes legally available since cannabis
has analgesic properties. Chu (2015) nds that treatment admissions for heroin addiction
are 20% lower in states with MCL. This result is not robust to the inclusion of quadratic
time trends, whether they are state-specic or not. Smith (2017) estimates a similarly sized
decline in opioid-related treatment admissions in core-based statistical areas (CBSA) with
medical cannabis dispensaries.
Two studies have shown that MCL may lower opioid-related mortality. Bachhuber et al.
(2014) use data from 1999 to 2010 and estimate a 25% reduction mortality rates in states
with legalized medical cannabis. Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) extend their sample
period to 2013 and nd that an MCL alone lowers mortality rates by 8% to 21% depending on
whether they include states that adopted an MCL after 2010. Importantly, Powell, Pacula,
and Jacobson (2018) show that it is not the MCL per se that is associated with lower
mortality rates, but rather whether a state legally protects medical cannabis dispensaries
and dispensaries are actually operating in the state. Specically, they estimate that active
and legal dispensaries lower opioid mortality rates by 40% to 43% in the 1999 to 2010 time
period and by about 23% in the 1999 to 2013 time period. They obtain similar results
when adding heroin-related mortality. In contrast, the eect of MCL is not statistically
signicant when both MCL and active and legal dispensaries are included in the regression.
The estimated patterns for opioid-related treatment admissions are similar. In determining
the eects of MCL on opioid-related outcomes it is therefore not simply the legal status that
matters but more so whether potential users can access medical cannabis legally through
dispensaries.4 Bachhuber et al. (2014) and Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) employ
state-level DD regressions without time trends.
4Pacula et al. (2015) and Chapman et al. (2016) highlight the importance of accounting for dierences
in MCL.
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Smith (2017) and Garin, Pohl, and Smith (2018) use a more granular approach that
emphasizes the role of dispensaries. Garin, Pohl, and Smith (2018) consider states that
eventually legalize medical cannabis and show that counties in these states that had operat-
ing dispensaries experience lower opioid and heroin-related mortality than counties without
dispensaries. Both Smith (2017) and Garin, Pohl, and Smith (2018) include state-specic
time trends in their CBSA- and county-level regressions.
2.3 Other Policies
Most states have addressed the opioid crisis by implementing measures that are aimed at
restricting access to opioids or at alleviating the consequences of their use. Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP) are the primary policy in the rst category. Under a
PDMP, physicians and/or pharmacists obtain information on their patients' previous use of
controlled drugs from a central statewide database before writing or lling a new prescription.
Evidence on the eectiveness of PDMP is mixed. Paulozzi, Kilbourne, and Desai (2011) and
Li et al. (2014) do not nd that these programs lower mortality. In contrast, Patrick et al.
(2016), Buchmueller and Carey (2018), Dave, Grecu, and Saer (2017), Meinhofer (2017),
and Pardo (2017) show that the eectiveness of PDMP depends on their characteristics,
and more robust programs can be successful in reducing opioid-related mortality and drug
abuse. In particular, policies that require providers to use PDMP lower the number of opioid
prescriptions and related mortality.
Another supply-side intervention is the reformulation of OxyContin to make it harder to
abuse. Alpert, Powell, and Pacula (2017) and Evans, Lieber, and Power (2018) show that
the OxyContin reformulation led to lower rates of misuse of this drug but also increased
heroin overdose mortality as OxyContin users substituted towards heroin. In addition, a few
states have passed Pill Mill Bills to reduce access to prescription drugs outside of legitimate
medical providers. Mallatt (2017) nds that these laws can reduce the number of oxycodone
prescriptions.
On the demand side, states have passed Naloxone Access Laws and Good Samaritan Laws
to alleviate the fatal consequences of opioid use. Naloxone Access Laws allow unqualied
individual to administer Naloxone, which counteracts the eects of an opioid overdose. Good
Samaritan Laws give individuals immunity for crimes related to drug possession if they seek
medical care in case of an overdose. Both of these types of laws are therefore designed to
prevent fatal outcomes in the event of a drug overdose. Rees et al. (2017) nd that Naloxone
Access Laws and Good Samaritan Laws lowered opioid overdose mortality by about 10%.
These laws do not necessarily reduce consumption of opioids. On the contrary, they could
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increase consumption because they lower the risk of death from overdoses and therefore
implicitly make opioids safer to consume. Accordingly, Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) show
that Naloxone Access Laws led to an increase in opioid-related emergency room visits and
more larger numbers of thefts to nance opioid addiction. Although Naloxone Access Laws
do not aect mortality overall, they nd an increase in opioid overdose deaths associated
with Naloxone Access Laws in the Midwest by 14%. Both studies employe DD regressions,
but Rees et al. (2017) do not include time trends whereas Doleac and Mukherjee (2018)
control for linear state-specic time trends. Hence, in the case of Naloxone Access Laws,
controlling for state-specic time trends can change conclusions about the eectiveness of
the policy.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data Sources
Using the universe of death records from 1999 to 2015 from the CDC's National Vital Statis-
tics System (NVSS) and population data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End
Results (SEER) Program, I construct mortality rates per 100,000 population on the state
and year level. The NVSS mortality data contain multiple causes of death, which allows
me to identify the type of drug that was involved in a given death. I dene opioid over-
doses as deaths due to \Accidental poisoning" (ICD-10 codes X40 to X44), \Intentional
self-poisoning" (X60 to X69), \Assault by drugs, medicaments and biological substances"
(X85), or \Poisoning with undetermined intent" (Y10 to Y14) where heroin (T40.1), other
opioids (T40.2), methadone (T40.3), or other synthetic opioids (T40.4) are listed as a con-
tributing cause of death. \Other opioids" include natural and semisynthetic opioids and in
particular prescription opioids. Since it is often not observable by medical examiners which
specic opioid caused a death and whether it was prescribed or obtained illegally, I combine
the codes T40.2 to T40.4 in the main results and refer to these drugs simply as \opioids."
I obtain information on relevant state and year level policies from various existing studies
that have collected policy information from original sources.5 To measure legal access to
medical cannabis, I follow the approach proposed by Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) and
dierentiate between MCL and whether a state legally protects dispensaries and dispensaries
are actually operating in the state (active and legal dispensaries). I rely on the policy data
collected by these authors for the 1999 to 2013 period (see also Chriqui et al., 2002; Pacula
5I am grateful to these authors for publishing their policy variables.
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et al., 2002; Pacula, Boustead, and Hunt, 2014). For the post-2013 period, I use information
on MCL and dispensary status from Smith (2017). In addition, I use information on state
laws that require the use of PDMP from Meinhofer (2017), on Naloxone Access Laws and
Good Samaritan Laws from Rees et al. (2017), and on Pill Mill Bills from Mallatt (2017).
Control variables includes states' demographic composition (fraction male, fraction white,
and fractions aged 15 to 19, 20 to 64, and 65 and over), which I obtain from population data
from the SEER Program.6 I also control for state-level unemployment rates derived from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics's Local Area Unemployment Statistics and states' beer tax
rates obtained from the Beer Institute's Brewers Almanac.7
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows state-year-level summary statistics for opioid-related mortality rates, policy
variables, and demographic covariates by medical cannabis legalization status. For opioids
overall as well as for individual types of opioids and heroin, mortality rates are higher when
an MCL is implemented and even higher when there are active and legal dispensaries. These
dierences are unconditional and do not imply a positive eects of medical cannabis legal-
ization on opioid-related mortality. Policies that are intended to alleviate the opioid crisis
are positively correlated with MCL and active and legal dispensaries. This relationship is
partly due to the fact that more states legalized medical cannabis over the sample period
and increasingly implemented PDMP, Naloxone Access Laws, and Good Samaritan Laws.
It also highlights the importance of controlling for the presence of other policies when es-
timating the eect of MCL. In the regressions below, I also control for the beer tax rate,
the unemployment rates, and demographics. These covariates do not dier substantially by
medical cannabis legalization status.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the eect of legalizing medical cannabis on opioid-related mortality, I follow
Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) and dierentiate between MCL per se and whether
a state has active and legal medical cannabis dispensaries. Since actual access to medical
cannabis may be more important than its legal status, it is important to distinguish between
these two levels of medical cannabis's status in a given state (see also Smith, 2017; Garin,
6See https://seer.cancer.gov/popdata/.
7See https://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm and http://www.beerinstitute.org/multimedia/brewers-
almanac/.
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Pohl, and Smith, 2018). The baseline DD regression for state-year-level opioid overdose
mortality rates is
logpMRstq  n1MCLst   n2ALDst  X 1stn   ns   nt   unst, (1)
where MRst is the mortality rate per 100,000 population in state s and year t. I consider
four specic mortality rates: due to opioids overall (excluding heroin), prescription opioids,
heroin, and synthetic opioids. The main policy variables are MCLst and ALDst. MCLst
is a dummy variable that equals one if state s has legalized medical cannabis in year t
and zero otherwise. ALDst is an indicator variable that turns on if state s has active
and legal dispensaries in year t. The vector Xst includes indicators for whether the other
policies mentioned above (required PDMP, Naloxone Access Laws, Good Samaritan Laws,
and Pill Mill Bills) are in place as well as additional control variables (the beer tax rate,
unemployment rate, and fraction white, male, aged 15 to 19, 20 to 64, and 65 and over).
Finally, ns and 
n
t are state and year xed eects. The superscript
n stands for \no time
trends" to distinguish the coecients in regression (1) from the regressions with state-specic
time trends below. Standard errors are clustered on the state level.
The coecients of interest are n1 and 
n
2 . They measure the approximate percentage eect
of the implementation of an MCL and of whether a state has active and legal dispensaries
on opioid-related mortality. To assess if medical cannabis legalization has an eect on opioid
overdose mortality overall, I test the joint hypothesis H0 : 
n
1  n2  0 and report the
corresponding p-value.
To allow for dierent trends in opioid-related mortality across states, I add linear state-
specic time trends lst to regression (1):
logpMRstq  l1MCLst   l2ALDst  X 1stl   ls   lt   lst  ulst. (2)
If the true relationship between medical cannabis legalization and opioid-related mortality is
given by regression (2) instead of regression (1), the time trends would be part of the error
term in regression (1), i.e. unst  lst   ulst. Omitting time trends would therefore lead to
biased estimates ^n1 and ^
n
2 if the implementation of MCL or active and legal dispensaries is
correlated with state-specic time trends lst. This would occur, for instance, if states where
opioid mortality rates grow relatively slowly are more likely to legalize medical cannabis.
If states do not exhibit dierential mortality trends, however, including state-specic time
trends would introduce additional noise, thereby leading to inecient estimates. The as-
sumption of linear time trends may be too restrictive since opioid mortality rates have started
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to grow at a faster than constant rate in recent years.8 I therefore allow for quadratic time
trends in addition to the linear time trends in regression (2) by adding the term qs t
2:
logpMRstq  q1MCLst   q2ALDst  X 1stq   qs   qt   qst  qs t2   uqst. (3)
To assess whether mortality trends dier across states and therefore make the inclusion of
state-specic time trends necessary, I test the hypothesis H0 : 
l
s  ls1 ; @s; s1 after estimating
regression (2) and the hypotheses H0 : 
q
s  qs1 ; @s; s1 and H0 : qs  qs1 ; @s; s1 after regression
(3). Rejecting these hypotheses implies that states exhibit dierent trends in opioid-related
mortality rates over time, but not necessarily that these time trends are correlated with the
implementation of MCL or active and legal dispensaries. I revisit the role of state-specic
time trends in Section 5.
4 Results
4.1 Assessing the Common Trends Assumption
Before discussing the regression results, I provide descriptive evidence that shows whether the
common trends assumption is violated. In Figure 1, I plot mean mortality rates per 100,000
population for deaths due to opioids, i.e. prescription opioids, methadone, and synthetic
opioids combined, and heroin. I calculate mean mortality rates in each year for three groups
of states: those that never implemented an MCL by 2015, those that had an MCL in place
in a given year, and those that did not have an MCL in a given year but implemented it
by 2015, see Figures 1a and 1c. I also plot the analogue mean mortality rates by whether
states had active and legal dispensaries, implemented them at a later point in time, or never
had them, see Figures 1b and 1d. To assess the common trends assumption, the relevant
comparison is between the states that never implemented an MCL or never had active and
legal dispensaries and between states that did so at a later year (MCL-states before MCL
and ALD-states before ALD on Figure 1's labels).
Figure 1a shows that mortality rates in states without an MCL and MCL-states before
the law's implementation trended similarly between 1999 and 2006 but diverged afterwards.
Specically, the growth in opioid overdose mortality slowed in MCL-states before they im-
plemented the law. The pattern by dispensary status in Figure 1b is similar. Up to 2006,
mortality trends are parallel with states that later implemented their MCL having higher
8The outcome variable is log-mortality rates, which makes it more likely that linear time trends are
sucient. However, I can test whether quadratic time trends should be included, see below.
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rates. Starting in 2006, however, the mortality trends diverge. Since the majority of MCL
were implemented after 2006, these diverging mortality trends imply that the common trends
assumption is violated. Put dierently, states that introduced an MCL after 2006 (the treat-
ment group) experienced dierent pre-treatment trends in the outcome of interest than states
that did not have an MCL (the control group). In particular, the introduction of MCL is
associated with lower mortality, which likely introduces selection bias. Controlling for state
and year xed eects is unlikely to solve this issue because there is not simply a parallel
dierence in trends that these two sets of xed eects would control for. Rather, it is likely
that state-specic time trends are necessary to reduce selection bias.
The trends in heroin-related mortality rates, shown in Figures 1c and 1d, do not exhibit
the same extent of divergence between states that never had MCL or active and legal dis-
pensaries and states with a later MCL or active and legal dispensaries start date. There is
some evidence that heroin mortality rates grow faster in the treatment group at the end of
the sample period, however, especially when classifying states by their dispensary status.
Next, I compare the opioid overdose mortality growth after 1999 in states that imple-
mented an MCL or had active and legal dispensaries to states that did not. Specically, I
calculate the percentage change in combined opioid and heroin mortality rates per 100,000
population between 1999 and the year before the rst full year that a state had an MCL
or active and legal dispensaries. Table 2 shows the resulting percentage changes by MCL
status. For example, the table indicates that mortality rates in Colorado and Hawaii, which
implemented an MCL in 2001, decline by 1% between 1999 and 2000 on average. During the
same time, states that had never had an MCL by 2015 experienced an increase in mortality
rates by 49%. The same pattern holds for all the remaining years: states that implemented
an MCL saw a lower rise on opioid-related mortality in the years before the MCL came into
eect than states without an MCL during the sample period. The dierence can be substan-
tial. Mortality increased by 44% on average in Arizona, the District of Columbia, and New
Jersey between 1999 and 2010, for example, whereas it grew by 492% in never-MCL states.
Table 3 shows a similar pattern for states that had active and legal dispensaries compared
to states that never allowed dispensaries to operate by 2015. Between 1999 and 2013, for
example, mortality rates rose by 233% in the District of Columbia, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, which started having active and
legal dispensaries in 2014, whereas mortality increased by 432% in states that never had
active and legal dispensaries over the same time period. The smaller mortality growth in
states with active and legal dispensaries also holds in all other years. These results clearly
show that states with active and legal dispensaries are negatively selected on pre-existing
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mortality trends. Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 provide additional evidence that states
with an MCL or active and legal dispensaries experienced lower mortality rates in the years
leading up to an MCL implementation or start of active and legal dispensaries than states
that did not legalize medical cannabis or dispensaries.
Figure 1 and Tables 2 and 3 show simple mean mortality rates and their changes without
controlling for state and year xed eects or other covariates. Nevertheless, this evidence
suggests that the common trends assumption underlying a standard DD analysis is likely
violated in this case. In Section 5.2, I provider further evidence against the common trends
assumption conditional on state and year xed eects and covariates.
4.2 Impact of MCL and Dispensary Status on Opioid-Related
Mortality
For each mortality outcome, I estimate regressions for the time periods 1999 to 2010, 1999
to 2013, and 1999 to 2015. The rst time period corresponds to the rst wave of the opioid
crisis that mostly involved prescription opioids, the second set of regressions adds the years
during which heroin emerged as the main driver of opioid-related mortality, and the 1999 to
2015 time period also captures the recent increase in mortality due to synthetic opioids. For
each of these three time periods, I estimate regression (1) without time trends, regression
(2) with linear state-specic time trends, and regression (3) with quadratic time trends.
First, I consider the eect of MCL and active and legal dispensaries on the log-mortality
rate per 100,000 population due to opioids, which include prescription opioids, methadone,
and synthetic opioids, i.e. all types of opioids excluding heroin. Table 4 shows the regression
results. Starting with the 1999 to 2010 period and no time trends, column (1) shows a
coecient of 0:186, which corresponds to a decline in opioid-related mortality by 17%
when an MCL is in eect. This eect is nearly identical to the corresponding estimate
found by Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) and slightly smaller than in Bachhuber et al.
(2014). This eect is signicant at the 10% level. In addition, active and legal dispensaries
reduce opioid mortality rates by an additional 26%, and this estimate is signicant at the
1% level. These estimates conrm the results in Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018), i.e. it
is not primarily the implementation of an MCL that lowers opioid-related mortality, but it
is more important whether a state has legalized medical cannabis dispensaries and they are
operational.
Adding linear state-specic time trends slightly increases the point estimate for the eect
of MCL, but lowers its precision, see column (2). When adding quadratic state trends in
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column (3), the eect of MCL on opioid-related mortality rates equals 0:4% and is not
signicant at conventional levels, i.e. the negative eect of MCL on opioid overdose mortality
disappears. The estimated eect of active and legal dispensaries also substantially changes
when linear or quadratic state trends are included. The point estimate is reduced to about a
third and the eect loses its statistical signicance. When adding linear and quadratic time
trends, the MCL and dispensary status indicators are not jointly statistically signicant,
with p-values for the associated F -tests of 0.20 and 0.94. In other words, when allowing for
state-specic time trends, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that MCL and dispensary status
have no eect on opioid-related mortality. This conclusion contrasts with the estimates that
do not account for state trends in column (1) and which point to a strong mortality-reducing
eect of MCL and especially active and legal dispensaries.
Next, I revisit the role of state-specic time trends when the sample period is extended
to 2013 or 2015. Due to the changing nature of the opioid crisis, these results are important
in their own right. In the 1999 to 2013 sample without time trends, the eects of MCL and
active and legal dispensaries are attenuated and less precisely estimated compared to the
1999 to 2010 sample, but the overall pattern is similar, see column (4) in Table 4. When
testing the joint eect of MCL and active and legal dispensaries, the resulting p-value equals
0.08, i.e. the two variables are marginally jointly signicant. Once I add linear or quadratic
state trends, MCL and dispensary status have no statistically signicant eect on opioid-
related mortality and some point estimates even become positive. The p-values for testing
the joint eect of MCL and active and legal dispensaries in the regressions in column (5)
and (6) equal 0.67 and 0.60.
When further extending the sample to 2015, neither MCL nor dispensary status have
a statistically signicant eect on opioid-related mortality regardless of whether I include
state trends in the regression, with most point estimates being positive. Moreover, MCL
and dispensary status are not jointly signicant with p-values of 0.80, 0.75, and 0.71 in the
regressions in columns (7), (8), and (9). This nding suggests that the evolving nature of
the opioid crisis led to a change in the relationship between medical cannabis legalization
and opioid-related mortality. While substitution from opioids to cannabis may have lowered
mortality rates before 2010, this eect disappeared in more recent years as mortality due to
heroin and synthetic opioid overdoses rapidly increased. However, accounting for dierences
in pre-existing mortality trends across states sheds doubt on the notion that MCL had a
signicantly negative eect on opioid-related mortality even before 2010. For all sample
periods and specications with time trends, I strongly reject the null hypotheses that linear
and quadratic trends are identical across states, see the last two rows in Table 4. This
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suggests that accounting for state-specic time trends is indeed necessary when modeling
opioid-related mortality rates.
4.3 Impact of MCL and Dispensary Status on Mortality Related
to Specic Types of Opioids and Heroin
After analyzing the impact of MCL and active and legal dispensaries on opioid-related mor-
tality overall, i.e. the sum of deaths due to prescription and synthetic opioids and methadone,
I consider eects on mortality related to prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids
separately in this section. The regression results for prescription opioids are shown in Table
5, which follows the same structure as Table 4. For the 1999 to 2010 period, when prescrip-
tion drugs were the main driver of the opioid crisis, the overall patterns are similar to those
in Table 4, but the eects of MCL and active and legal dispensaries are larger in absolute
value. Without including state trends, MCL reduce mortality due to prescription opioids
by 31% and active and legal dispensaries lower mortality rates by an additional 37%, see
column (1). These eects are signicant at the 1% level.
As with opioids overall, the signicantly negative eect of active and legal dispensaries
disappears in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 when I control for state trends. The eect of
MCL does not change when I add only linear trends but is cut by two thirds and loses its
statistical signicance when I introduce quadratic time trends. Hence, the mitigating eect
of medical cannabis legalization on mortality due to prescription opioids is more robust than
for opioids overall, but accounting for dierential state trends nevertheless aects the results.
When I extend the sample to 2013 or 2015, the patterns are similar but attenuated
compared to the 1999 to 2010 sample period. MCL and active legal dispensaries lower
prescription opioid mortality by 21% and 28% during the 1999 to 2013 period when I do not
include time trends, see column (4) in Table 5. These eects become closer to zero or positive
and statistically insignicant when I add linear or quadratic state-specic time trends in the
regressions in columns (5) and (6). Similarly, MCL and active and legal dispensaries have
smaller and less precisely estimated negative eects on prescription opioid overdoses in the
1999 to 2015 sample, see column (7), and these eects become economically and statistically
insignicant when I add linear or quadratic state trends, see columns (8) and (9). The
last two rows in Table 5 show that state-specic time trends should be included in these
regressions since I strongly reject the null hypotheses that linear and quadratic trends are
the same across states.
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Next, I consider the eects of MCL and dispensaries on mortality due to heroin over-
doses. These deaths are not included in the opioid mortality rates studied in Section 4.2.
Starting with the 1999 to 2010 period during which heroin played a less important role than
prescription opioids, I nd that legalizing medical cannabis and dispensaries has a strong
negative eect on heroin-related mortality. Specically, MCL reduce mortality rates by 71%
and active and legal dispensaries lower it by another 49% when I do not control for time
trends, see column (1) in Table 6, and these eects are statistically signicant at the 5%
and 1% level, respectively. When I add linear or quadratic state-specic time trends in the
regressions in columns (2) and (3), the eect of MCL is smaller, with a reduction in mortality
by 46% and 53%. These eects are only signicant at the 10% level. Similarly, the impact
of active and legal dispensaries is reduced and the estimated coecients lose their statistical
signicance when I add time trends. These results suggest that MCL mitigated the part of
the opioid crisis that was related to heroin in the 1999 to 2010 period and this eect is robust
to the inclusion on state trends. In contrast, dispensary status does not play a signicant
role for heroin overdose mortality once dierential trends in this outcome variable across
states are accounted for.
Heroin overdoses played a more important role after 2010, so considering the 1999 to
2013/2015 samples is particularly relevant here. The mortality-reducing eect of MCL be-
comes smaller in these samples compared to the 1999 to 2010 period, but still ranges between
53% and 41%, see columns (4) and (7) in Table 6, and it is signicant at least at the 10%
level. When I add linear or quadratic time trends, the eects become smaller in absolute
value. Depending on the sample period, they range between 25% and 47% and are signicant
at most at the 10% level, see columns (5), (6), (8), and (9). Hence, in contrast to opioids,
the mitigating eects of MCL on heroin overdose mortality are more pronounced even in the
longer sample periods and more robust to including state-specic time trends. Neverthe-
less, the point estimates increase towards zero when I account for state trends, although the
dierences are not statistically signicant. Active and legal dispensaries only signicantly
reduce mortality in the 1999 to 2015 sample, by 33%, if no time trends are included. In the
other specications, dispensary status does not have a statistically signicant eect. This
nding suggests that MCL play a more important role in reducing heroin-related mortal-
ity than dispensary status. Testing the null hypotheses of equal linear and quadratic time
trends shows that including linear state-specic time trends is likely sucient in the case of
heroin-related mortality, see the last two rows in Table 6. Specically, I cannot reject the
null hypotheses in the specications with quadratic time trends except for the 1999 to 2015
sample period.
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Finally, I estimate the eect of MCL and dispensaries on mortality due to synthetic
opioids. Since this type of drug only started to play an important role in the opioid crisis in
recent years, I focus on the 1999 to 2015 sample period here. Table 7 shows the regression
results. In contrast to the other drugs, the eects of MCL and active and legal dispensaries on
synthetic opioid overdose mortality are mostly not signicantly negative with one exception,
independent of the sample period and whether I include time trends. The regression results
rule out any alleviating eect of medical cannabis legalization on mortality due to synthetic
opioid overdoses. Similarly to the results on heroin-related mortality, I cannot reject the null
hypotheses that linear and quadratic time trends are equal across states in the specication
with quadratic trends in the sample periods until 2010 and 2013. There is strong evidence,
however, that linear time trends dier across states and should therefore be included in
regressions of overdose mortality related to synthetic opioids.
4.4 Eects of Other Policies
While the main focus of this paper is on the impact of MCL, the analysis discussed above
also serves as a suitable framework to study the eect of policies that are explicitly aimed
at alleviating the opioid crisis. Here, I consider the impact of PDMP that medical providers
are required to use, Naloxone Access Laws, Good Samaritan Laws, and Pill Mill Bills.9
Table 4 provides some evidence that required PDMD increase mortality due to opioids
(including prescription and synthetic opioids and methadone) by about 32% during the 1999
to 2010 sample period (see column (1)). These eects disappear, however, when linear or
quadratic time trends are added. In the same time period, required PDMP lower mortality
due to heroin overdoses. This impact is large (63% to 67% reduction in mortality rates)
and highly statistically signicant only in the 1999 to 2010 sample period and when linear
or quadratic time trends are included (see columns (2) and (3) in Table 6). When I extend
the sample period to 2013, I nd suggestive evidence that PDMP lower mortality related
to prescription opioid overdoses by about 19%, at least in the specication that includes
quadratic time trends (see column (6) in Table 5). The latter result is consistent with the
ndings by Meinhofer (2017). I do not nd any statistically signicant eects when using the
1999 to 2015 sample period. Overall, required PDMP do not have a strong and systematic
impact on opioid-related mortality rates.
Naloxone Access Laws reduce opioid-related mortality rates by 22% in the 1999 to 2010
sample when no time trends are included (see column (1) in Table 4), but lead to a mortality
9There are several papers studying the eects of these policies, see Section 2.3, so I focus on how adding
state-specic time trends aects the results.
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increase by 25% when linear state-specic time trends are included (see column (2)). The
eect is also positive but not statistically signicant with quadratic time trends. There are
similar patterns for the 1999 to 2013 sample period and for mortality related to prescription
opioids (Table 5) and heroin (Table 6). Generally, Naloxone Access Laws have a sizable
negative eect without controlling for state trends, but once linear state trends are included,
these laws are associated with a rise in mortality rates. This increase can be substantial, for
example for mortality related to heroin and synthetic opioids in the 1999 to 2013 sample (see
column (5) in Table 6 and column (6) in Table 7). These ndings are consistent with the
existing literature on Naloxone Access Laws. Rees et al. (2017) do not include state trends
and estimate negative eects whereas Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) control for linear state
trends and nd no eect overall but an increase in opioid mortality in the Midwest. The
eects of Naloxone Access Laws on opioid- and heroin-related mortality therefore provide
another case for why time trends matter when evaluating state-level policies.
The eects of Good Samaritan Laws follow a similar pattern to those of Naloxone Access
Laws. In particular, these laws reduce opioid mortality by about 25% in the 1999 to 2010
sample when no time trends are added (see column (1) in Table 4), but this eect becomes
positive with linear state trends ( 54%, see column (2)) and loses its statistical signicance
with quadratic time trends (column (3)). When the sample period is extended to 2013 or
2015, Good Samaritan Laws lower opioid-related mortality in the specication with quadratic
state trends (columns (6) and (9)). These eects range between 10% and 26% and are
statistically signicant at least at the 10% level. Hence, there is some evidence that Good
Samaritan Laws can lead to a reduction in opioid-related mortality even in more recent
years when dierences in state-specic mortality trends are accounted for. For prescription
opioid mortality in Table 5, the eects of Good Samaritan Laws are similar but less precisely
estimated. In addition, these laws are associated with a substantial increase in heroin-related
mortality, at least in the 1999 to 2013 sample when quadratic time trends are included (see
column (6) in Table 6).
Finally, Pill Mill Bills have a large negative and statistically signicant eect on mortality
related to opioids overall, and prescription and synthetic opioids in the 1999 to 2010 sample
when no time trends are included (see column (1) in Tables 4, 5, and 7). These eects range
between 30% and 48%. In specications with linear or quadratic trends and when the
sample period is extended to 2013 or 2015, the impact of Pill Mill Bills loses its statistical
signicance with point estimates that are mostly positive. Hence, the conclusions about the
impact of these bills are similar to those regarding MCL. They seem to have alleviated the
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opioid crisis during its rst wave until 2010, but the mortality-reducing eect disappears in
later years and when accounting for dierences in opioid mortality trends across states.
5 The Role of State-Specic Time Trends
In this section, I discuss the role of time trends in DD regressions in more general terms. I
also propose a simple visual test for the presence of group-specic time trends and apply it
in the context of MCL and opioid-related mortality.
5.1 Theory
I start with the usual DD regression for state-year-level data that countless economic studies
have employed to evaluate various state-level policies. To focus on the main points, I use
a simplied version of regression (1) without the indicator variable for active and legal
dispensaries and without additional covariates:
Yst  MCLst   s   t   ust. (4)
To estimate the causal eect of MCL on opioid-related mortality, , the usual assumption is
that
ErYst|s; ts  MCLst   s   t,
which is equivalent to Erust|s; ts  0. That is, conditional on state and year, the error
term in regression (4) has mean zero. This assumption is known as the common trends
assumption. In this context, it implies that opioid overdose mortality rates cannot follow a
dierent trend over time in states that did and did not implement an MCL. In other words,
in the absence of the implementation of MCL the mortality trends in both groups of states
would have been parallel.
If the common trends assumption holds, the causal eect  can be estimated via the DD
estimator as follows. In the two states and two time periods case, for example (see Card and
Krueger, 1994), if state s1 implemented the MCL in year t1 whereas no MCL was eective at
any time in state s0 and in year t0 in state s1,  would be given by the following expression:
ErYs1t1 |s1; t1s  ErYs1t0 |s1; t0s  pErYs0t1 |s0; t1s  ErYs0t0 |s0; t0sq  .
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In practice, the data contain multiple states with and without MCL, and the laws are
implemented at dierent time periods in each state. In this case, a regression-based DD
estimator averages over all state-year comparisons.
Instead of regression (4), it is plausible that the true relationship between MCL and
opioid-related mortality is given by
Yst  MCLst   s   t   st  st, (5)
where st is a linear state-specic time trend and Erst|s; ts  0. In contrast to regression
(4), which assumes that the time eects t are identical across states, regression (5) allows
for systematic dierences between states in how opioid mortality rates evolve over time. As
a consequence, if the s dier across states the common trends assumption is violated. This
is of particular concern if s1  s0 , i.e. if opioid-related mortality in states with an MCL
follows a dierent trend than in non-MCL states. Since the opioid crisis aects some states
more than others (see Section 4.1), it is likely that regression (5) is a better representation
of the underlying data generating process than regression (4).
When state-specic time trends are present in the true relationship between MCL and
opioid overdose mortality but one estimates regression (4), the expected value of the treat-
ment eect, would be given by
ErYs1t1 |s1; t1s  ErYs1t0 |s1; t0s  pErYs0t1 |s0; t1s  ErYs0t0 |s0; t0sq     ps1  s0qpt1  t0q.
If the time trends in both states are identical, i.e. if the common trends assumption is
satised, this expression reduces to  and the DD estimator recovers the true causal eect.10
In contrast, this is not the case if the state-specic time trends dier. For example, if the
state that implemented an MCL has a lower mortality trend, i.e. s1   s0 ,
   ps1  s0qpt1  t0q   .
In other words, when estimating regression (4) although the true relationship between MCL
and mortality rates is given by equation (5) and opioid-related mortality in states that
implemented MCL grows more slowly, the estimated coecient of interest is downward
biased. This constitutes a form of selection bias in the sense that states that implemented
an MCL are selected based on lower pre-existing mortality trends.
10Note that the DD regression (@eq:didtrend) is not identied in the two-period case. The data in the
application span at least 12 years, so this is not a practical concern in this case.
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Put dierently, if regression (4) reects the true relationship between MCL and opioid
mortality rates, the error term in regression (4) has mean zero conditional on state and year:
Erust|s; ts  0. In contrast, if regression (5) reects the true relationship and one estimates
regression (4), the error term has a conditional mean dierent from zero:
Erust|s; ts  Erst   st|s; ts  ErYst  MCLst  s  ts  st.
I use the fact that the error terms contain information on whether regression (4) or (5) denotes
the true relationship between MCL and opioid mortality rates to implement an informal and
visual specication test as follows. After estimating regression (4), the residuals
u^nst  Yst  ^ns  ^nt (6)
should not exhibit a dierential trend for any state regardless of the states' MCL status if
the assumption Erust|s; ts  0 is correct. Specically, the residuals for MCL-states before
they implemented the law should not trend dierently from states that never had an MCL
over the same time period. On the contrary, if regression (5) reects the true relationship,
the residuals may exhibit dierent trends. Moreover, MCL-states would show a lower trend
than non-MCL-states if s1   s0 on average, where s1 indexes states that implemented an
MCL during the sample period and s0 those that did not. Note that the residuals in equation
(6) do not include the term ^MCLst because I am interested in the residual trends in the
absence of the treatment.
To assess the common trends assumption and to determine whether regression (4) or (5)
more likely represents the true relationship between MCL and opioid mortality, I plot the
residuals in equation (6) over time and separately for states that have not legalized medical
cannabis, those that have implemented an MCL, and those with active and legal dispensaries
at some point during the sample period. I then assess whether the residuals that correspond
to state-year observations without an MCL or active and legal dispensaries between the three
categories of states. In other words, I check whether pre-existing trends in opioid mortality
residuals dier by medical cannabis's legal status. If the residuals do not show dierent
trends, regression (4) is likely an accurate representation of the true relationship. However,
if the residuals for MCL-states or states with active and legal dispensaries exhibit dierent
pre-trends from states that did not legalize medical cannabis, the common trends assumption
is possibly violated. When I include linear and quadratic state-specic time trends in the
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regression and plot the resulting residuals
u^lst  Yst  ^ls  ^lt  ^lst, (7)
and
u^qst  Yst  ^qs  ^qt  ^qst ^qs t2, (8)
a previously visible trend should disappear if regression (5) or a regression that also con-
tains quadratic state-specic time trends represent the true relationship between MCL and
mortality. A visual inspection of the residuals from regressions with and without (linear
or quadratic) state-specic time trends can therefore be informative about (i) the potential
selection bias in the regression without trends and (ii) whether adding state trends reduces
this bias.
5.2 Application
Next, I illustrate the use of the residual plots in the context of the regressions discussed
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. For opioids overall, Figures 2a, 2d, and 2g plot the residuals in
equation (6), Figures 2b, 2e, and 2h plot the residuals in equation (7), and Figures 2c, 2f,
and 2i plot the residuals in equation (8) separately for states that never legalized medical
cannabis by the end of the respective sample period, those that implemented an MCL but
never had active and legal dispensaries, and nally the states that had active and legal
dispensaries during the sample period. I distinguish between residuals that correspond to
state-year observations without an MCL or active and legal dispensaries (denoted by ) and
those when either an MCL was in place or a state had active and legal dispensaries (denoted
by  ). To aid the comparison, I indicate the best linear t for the residuals without MCL
or active and legal dispensaries since they correspond to the relevant mortality pre-trends.
I plot the residuals from regressions of opioid-related mortality rates (see Table 4) for the
1999 to 2010 sample period in the top row of Figure 2. While the residuals for non-MCL
states and for states with an MCL but without dispensaries are centered around zero and
do not exhibit a substantial trend, the residuals for the two states that had active and legal
dispensaries by 2010 (California and New Mexico) show a downward sloping trend when no
time trends are added in the underlying regression, see Figure 2a. That is, in the notation of
Section 5.1, 1   0.11 When linear or quadratic time trends are added, the residuals cease
to exhibit a trend and are instead centered around zero, as shown in Figures 2b and 2c.
11Clearly, basing this conclusion on two states is a stretch, but the result is the same when expanding the
sample period to 2013 and 2015, thereby adding more states with active and legal dispensaries (see below).
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These residual plots highlight the importance of accounting for potential dierences in
pre-existing opioid-mortality trends across states when estimating the impact of MCL and
dispensary status (and possibly other policies). In this case, states that allowed medical
cannabis dispensaries to operate exhibited a declining trend in opioid-related mortality com-
pared to states without active and legal dispensaries (conditional on state and year xed
eects and time-varying covariates). Therefore, not controlling for state-specic time trends
biases the estimated eect of dispensary status, in this case downward. Once these dier-
ential trends are accounted for via linear or quadratic state-specic time trends, the bias
vanishes as indicated by the horizontal t lines in Figures 2b and 2c. The regression results
in columns (1) to (3) in Table 4 also reect these ndings since the eects of MCL and active
and legal dispensaries become larger (albeit statistically insignicant) when state trends are
added. The residual plots in Figure 2 therefore provide a simple visual tool to assess dier-
ences in outcome trends across groups and to check that these dierences disappear when
group-specic trends are included in the regression.
The residual plots in Figures 2e and 2g show that the residuals from opioid-related
mortality regressions with state-specic time trends also exhibit a downward trend for states
with active and legal dispensaries when the sample period is extended to 2013 or 2015.
In contrast, states with an MCL that did not have active and legal dispensaries exhibit
an upward trend in opioid mortality residuals in the 1999 to 2015 sample. Once linear or
quadratic state trends are included in Figures 2e, 2f, 2h, and 2i, however, these trends mostly
disappear and the residuals are centered around zero for all years. Although the estimated
MCL and dispensary status coecients are not statistically signicant in columns (4) to (9) of
Table 4 with only one exception, the dierences in point estimates are nevertheless consistent
with the corresponding residual plots. In particular, the downward trend of residuals in states
with active and legal dispensaries points to a downward bias in the regression coecients
in columns (4) and (7), i.e. in the regressions that do not include time trends. Indeed, the
point estimates for both the dispensary status and the MCL eects are smaller in these
two regressions than in the regressions in columns (5) or (6) and (8) or (9), respectively,
although none of the latter is statistically signicant. Once this bias is removed, the impact
of MCL and active and legal dispensaries on opioid-related mortality increases towards zero
or becomes positive although the eects are too imprecisely measured to allow any denitive
conclusions.
For regressions of prescription opioid mortality, Figure 3a, which plots the residuals from
regressions without time trends for the 1999 to 2010 sample, shows a downward trend among
states that allowed dispensaries to operate by 2010, thereby pointing to possible downward
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bias for the dispensary status coecient. The downward trend in the mortality residuals
disappears when I add linear or quadratic state-specic time trends, see Figures 3b and 3c.
The residual plots in the bottom two rows of Figure 3 conrm the notion that the MCL and
dispensary eects in the regressions in columns (4) and (7) of Table 5 are downward biased
since prescription opioid mortality residuals exhibit a downward trend in states with active
and legal dispensaries, see Figures 3d and 3g. In contrast, when I add linear or quadratic
state trends, the residuals have no trend and are centered around zero, see Figures 3e, 3f,
3h, and 3i.
For regressions of heroin-related mortality, the residual plots in the top row of Figure 4
also indicate that the estimated MCL and dispensary eects may be subject to downward
bias if state trends are not included. Especially, the residuals for states with an MCL but
without active and legal dispensaries exhibit a strong downward sloping trend in Figure 4a,
indicating that the MCL coecient in column (1) of Table 6 overstates (in absolute value)
the true mitigating eect of MCL on heroin overdose mortality. The fact that the residuals'
downward trend disappears with linear or quadratic state trends, see Figures 4b and 4c,
suggests that the coecients in columns (2) and (3) are closer to the true eect.
The residual plots for heroin are less conclusive than for opioids. Without state trends,
residuals for states with an MCL but without active and legal dispensaries exhibit a down-
ward or upward trend depending on the sample period, see Figures 4d and 4g. Moreover, the
residuals for states with and MCL but without active and legal dispensaries trend upward in
the 1999 to 2015 sample. When linear or quadratic time trends are added, the trends do not
disappear entirely but become smaller and more similar across groups of states. Comparing
Figures 4g, 4h, and 4i shows that including linear or quadratic state-specic time trends
reduces dierences in residual trends across treatment groups and thereby potential lowers
the bias in the corresponding treatment eect estimates.
Figure 5 shows that the residuals from regressions of synthetic opioid mortality also follow
slightly dierent patterns than for the other types of opioids. When no time trends are added,
they follow an upward trend in states with MCL but without active and legal dispensaries
whereas the trend is downward sloping in states with active and legal dispensaries, see Figures
5a and 5d. With linear or quadratic state trends, the residuals' trend becomes completely
at only for states without MCL. In the case of synthetic opioids, it is not clear from these
residual plots how omitting state-specic time trends biases the MCL and active and legal
dispensaries coecients. However, most estimates for the eects of MCL and dispensary
status in Table 7 are not statistically signicant.
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Overall, the residual plots in Figures 2 to 5 demonstrate how a visual inspection of
residual trends can inform researchers about which of the underlying regression results is
likely biased due to a violation of the common trends assumption.
6 Conclusion
I estimate the impact of MCL and active and legal medical cannabis dispensaries and nd
that it is sensitive to the inclusion of state-specic time trends. This nding implies that the
common trends assumption that is necessary for DD regressions to deliver unbiased estimates
is violated. The estimated eects also vary with the sample period. As more recent years are
added, the impact of MCL generally diminishes, suggesting that they may have worked in
reducing opioid-related mortality in the early years of the opioid crisis but to a lesser extent
as the crisis has become more severe in recent years. Hence, MCL may not be as successful
in alleviating the opioid crisis as previously found. While medical cannabis legalization
may not achieve a reduction in opioid-related mortality on the state level, Garin, Pohl, and
Smith (2018) nd that counties where a dispensary operates experience signicantly lower
mortality rates compared to counties where medical cannabis is legal but no dispensary
exists. In addition, my results imply that other policies intended to mitigate the opioid
crisis are mostly ineective.
These ndings highlight the importance of carefully modeling group-specic time eects
in DD analyses. The common assumption of equal time trends across groups that underlies
the use of time xed eects is likely violated in many settings and at a minimum should be
tested, for example by using residual plots as a simple visual tool.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Medical Cannabis Legalization Status
(1) (2) (3)
No MCL/ALD MCL ALD
Opioid Mortality Rate 4.531 6.568 7.294
(3.813) (3.654) (3.831)
Prescription Opioid Mortality Rate 2.835 3.818 4.724
(2.879) (2.260) (2.385)
Heroin Mortality Rate 1.019 1.800 3.320
(1.414) (1.944) (2.460)
Synthetic Opioid Mortality Rate 0.938 1.332 2.083
(1.053) (2.313) (2.494)
Required PDMP 0.0287 0.0641 0.0400
(0.167) (0.246) (0.198)
Naloxone Access Law 0.0514 0.109 0.620
(0.221) (0.313) (0.490)
Good Samaritan Law 0.0227 0.103 0.420
(0.149) (0.304) (0.499)
Pill Mill Bill 0.0560 0 0
(0.230) (0) (0)
Beer Tax Rate 0.253 0.342 0.207
(0.205) (0.329) (0.106)
Unemployment Rate 5.521 6.542 6.796
(1.879) (2.300) (1.852)
Fraction Male 0.491 0.498 0.495
(0.00695) (0.0105) (0.00642)
Fraction White 0.821 0.789 0.822
(0.119) (0.203) (0.104)
Fraction Aged 15 to 19 0.0719 0.0696 0.0670
(0.00529) (0.00539) (0.00518)
Fraction Aged 20 to 64 0.594 0.609 0.602
(0.0157) (0.0145) (0.0194)
Fraction Aged 65 and Over 0.132 0.128 0.142
(0.0170) (0.0253) (0.0229)
Observations 661 156 50
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Mortality Rates are per
100,000 population. Opioids (in the rst row) include prescription opioids, methadone, and synthetic
opioids. \No MCL/ALD" refers to state-year observations without any medical cannabis legalization and
\MCL" and \ALD" refers to observations with a medical cannabis law and active and legal dispensaries,
respectively. 34
Table 2: Change in Opioid and Heroin Overdose Mortality Rates Since 1999 for States With
and Without Medical Cannbis Laws (MCL), by Year of MCL Introduction
Year t States With Change in Mortality Between 1999 and t 1
New MCL New-MCL States Never-MCL States
2000 AK, ME 0% 0%
2001 CO, HI 1% 49%
2002 NV 14% 116%
2005 MT, VT 156% 254%
2006 RI 230% 253%
2008 NM 32% 393%
2009 MI 366% 474%
2011 AZ, DC, NJ 44% 492%
2012 DE 207% 483%
2013 CT, MA 58% 491%
2014 IL, NH 182% 524%
2015 MD, MN, NY 187% 673%
Notes: Mortality rates include deaths related to all opioids and heroin. Percentage changes are calcu-
lated between 1999 and the year before the year indicated in the rst column. \New-MCL States" are
the states given in the second column that had an MCL for a full year for the rst time in the given year.
\Never-MCL States" are all remaining states: AL, AR, FL, GA, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, MS, MO, NE,
NC, ND, OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV, WI, and WY. CA, OR, and WA introduced an
MCL before 2000.
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Table 3: Change in Opioid and Heroin Overdose Mortality Rates Since 1999 for States With
and Without Active and Legal Dispensaries (ALD), by Year of First ALD
Year t States With Change in Mortality Between 1999 and t 1
New ALD New-ALD States Never-ALD States
2004 CA 9% 145%
2010 NM 1% 364%
2011 CO 61% 397%
2012 ME 183% 397%
2013 AZ, NJ 72% 401%
2014 DC, MI, MT, NV, 233% 432%
OR, RI, VT, WA
2015 CT 217% 557%
Notes: Mortality rates include deaths related to all opioids and heroin. Percentage changes are calcu-
lated between 1999 and the year before the year indicated in the rst column. \New-ALD States" are
the states given in the second column that had active and legal medical cannabis dispensaries for a full
year for the rst time in the given year. \Never-ALD States" are all remaining states: AL, AK, AR,
DE, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NH, NY, NC, ND, OH,
OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV, WI, and WY.
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